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Women and Superannuation: Labour Market Participation and Retirement Prospects 
Abstract 
Superannuation has risen to prominence as the vehicle for providing workers with 
additional retirement income, supplementing the government-provided age pension.  In 
Australia, the union movement spearheaded a move in 1986 to include superannuation as 
part of social wage considerations in National Wage Cases.  The stated objective of the 
Labor government in supporting superannuation was to improve the retirement incomes of 
low-income earners.  As women comprise a large portion of those earning low incomes, 
the effect on women will be significant.  This article analyses the gender implications of 
the shift to provide retirement incomes through a private sector-based superannuation 
system rather than the utilising the welfare system to provide a government-provided age 
pension.  The existing superannuation system has been criticised for creating inequalities 
for low-income earners and generally entrenching inequity for low income groups. This 
contention is considered in the article. 
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Introduction 
While occupational superannuation has widespread economic effects throughout all sectors 
of society, it was not perceived in terms of being an issue for women (Sharp and Broomhill, 
1988: 130). Sharp and Broomhill (1988: 130-1) consider this a fundamental error as the 
increasing incidence of female-headed households, longer life-span, and earlier retirement 
of women means that adequate superannuation is crucial for women. Further, it has been 
argued that: 
There is little question that the greatest measure of justice for 
women ... is to be found in public programs that are not 
related to earnings and are not designed primarily for those 
considered to be members of the active labour force .… 
(Gelber, 1975, cited in Hancock, 1977: 158) 
 
Among the difficulties experienced by women workers in gaining adequate retirement 
benefits through superannuation is the reliance on determining levels of contribution as a 
percentage of earnings and subsequent meagre returns resulting from small contributions.  
Sharp and Broomhill (1988: 157) advocate establishing a national superannuation scheme 
in order to promote equity among workers, but they also argue strongly against a scheme 
that is based on the level of contributions, as this is contended to increase the 
discriminatory effects for women. 
 
The policy shift to increase superannuation coverage for the Australian workforce has 
resulted in superannuation being extended to a broad range of workers as an industrial 
right, whereas traditionally superannuation was confined to a minority of workers 
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comprised mainly of white collar and professional males (Paatsch and Smith, 1992).  Kelty 
(1994: 10) states that the union strategy in the Prices and Incomes Accord moved 
superannuation from an employment benefit for ‘privileged men’ to a much wider range of 
workers.  However, income disparities along gender lines in relation to superannuation 
benefits are still significant.  The effect of differing career and work patterns, more limited 
access to superannuation and the extent of superannuation coverage mean that retirement 
incomes for women are markedly different from those of men.  It is argued that these 
disparities will intensify as the inequities resulting from the present superannuation system 
take effect for future retirees. In light of the eradication of the majority of discriminatory 
superannuation provisions (Millbank, 1993), this paper contends that the most significant 
factor creating unequal superannuation outcomes is the disadvantage experienced by 
women in the labour market.  
 
The Superannuation System 
While superannuation coverage had generally increased by the 1980s, the uneven 
distribution of superannuation together with the declining value of government-provided 
pensions resulted in increasing pressure to take up superannuation as an industrial issue 
(Brosnan, e.t al., 1996).  Through this process, superannuation became a key aspect of 
wage fixation and a major component of the Prices and Incomes Accord.   
 
Occupational superannuation coverage was first extended to a broader cross-section of 
workers following the 1986 National Productivity Case agreement between the Australian 
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Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Labor Government to trade off a wage rise for 3 
per cent award superannuation.  Although superannuation coverage significantly increased 
over the next few years, many workers were still denied access to superannuation 
entitlements due to a high incidence of employers failing to comply with award provisions, 
and large numbers of workers not being covered by awards (Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation, 1992).   
 
In 1992 the Labor Government introduced the Superannuation Guarantee (SG) legislation 
to redress the deficiencies of award superannuation.  Under the SG provisions, employers 
were initially required to contribute the equivalent of five per cent of workers’ wages (or 
three per cent if the employer’s payroll was under $1 million) into a superannuation fund.  
Through phased increases the rate has now reached seven per cent for all employers and 
will gradually rise further to a level of nine per cent by 2002.   
 
The former Labor Government had also foreshadowed the phased introduction of 
compulsory employee contributions of up to three per cent of wages, with a Government 
co-contribution of up to three per cent for workers on lower incomes.  Although the present 
Coalition Government had initially indicated they would not change this policy (Coalition 
Superannuation Policy Statement, March 1996), superannuation reforms announced with 
the 1996-97 Federal Budget included a review of compulsory employee contributions and 
the Government co-contribution (Treasurer, 1996), both of which were subsequently 
abandoned.   
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Notwithstanding the Government’s decision not to proceed with the introduction of 
compulsory employee superannuation contributions, superannuation savings are set to 
become a significant component of workers’ retirement incomes.  For many, 
superannuation has already become the expected major source of retirement income 
through a combination of compulsory superannuation (under SG and award provisions) and 
voluntary superannuation arrangements provided by many employers.   
 
Extent of Coverage 
Award and SG superannuation has contributed to the rise in superannuation coverage in 
recent years from 71 per cent in November 1991 to 81 per cent in November 1995 (ABS, 
1995: 1).  However, the general rise has obscured those sections that have experienced a 
fall in coverage.  The level of coverage for employees has risen but the general level of 
coverage for own account workers has fallen from 36 per cent to 31 per cent and for 
employers from 55 per cent to 51 per cent (ABS, 1995: 3).  Thirty one per cent of the 
employed people aged between 45 years and 75 years who were not contributing to a 
superannuation scheme gave as the main reason for not doing so the fact that they could not 
afford to contribute due to the high cost (ABS, 1995: 3).    
 
Figure 1 indicates females were less likely to have superannuation in every category of 
employed people.  A greater proportion of employees was covered than any other group, 
with 91 per cent of males and 87 per cent of females having superannuation.  Only 19 per 
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cent of self-employed female workers were covered by superannuation compared to 36 per 
cent of self-employed males. 
 
The superannuation coverage of part-time workers increased from 44 percent in 1991 to 61 
per cent in 1993 (ABS, 1995: 1).  However, since that time, the sector has experienced a 
rise to only 62 per cent as at November 1995 (ABS, 1995: 1).  As we note below, women 
comprise the majority of part-time workers.  The lower rates of superannuation coverage in 
this area are therefore highly significant for women. 
 
[Insert Figure about here1] 
 
The translation of differences in women’s career and earnings patterns into subsequent 
differential access to superannuation and levels of superannuation benefits is a difficult 
problem to address.  The competing perspectives in an industry with assets worth $377 
billion (APRA, 1999) means that powerful vested interests are involved in superannuation.  
What is at stake for women is the ability to reconcile the disparate industry, institutional, 
and community interests to provide appropriate policy instruments and processes to ensure 
adequate retirement incomes. 
 
Implications of Labour Market Patterns for Women’s Retirement Incomes 
While the industrial relations system has delivered women better superannuation coverage 
through award superannuation, this system will not necessarily translate into better 
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retirement incomes for women.  A superannuation system based on the level of lifetime 
earnings as the vehicle for retirement earnings entrenches women’s wage inequality in 
inequitable retirement income.  Women’s unequal career and wage outcomes, greater 
degree of interrupted careers and greater employment in part-time and casual jobs means 
that women cannot achieve high levels of superannuation savings and therefore cannot 
build substantial earnings in superannuation funds.  The result for women is a greater 
reliance on age pensions to fund retirement and the attendant problems of living below the 
poverty line.  
 
Many of the inequitable features of the superannuation system which affect women are a 
direct reflection of women’s position in the labour market.  Women are less likely to be in 
the labour market at all.  On average, they work fewer years of their lives, and work fewer 
weeks of the year.  To the extent that women’s participation rates have been increasing 
while men’s have been decreasing, the inequalities magnified and perpetuated by 
superannuation will be less.  However, women are more inclined to be employed on lower 
wages, to be employed for shorter hours, or employed as casuals when they do work.  Thus 
women will be severely disadvantaged by the superannuation system.  Since SG 
contributions are a percentage of wages received, those on lower wages have lower 
contributions made.  If they were unlucky enough to work for a small employer they will 
have had even lower contributions made.  In other words, the lower total income received 
from the labour market over her lifetime by the average woman results in a lower rate of 
superannuation after retirement. 
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Changing Labour Force Structures 
Most recent labour market trends point to superannuation contributions increasing inequity 
rather than decreasing it.  One of the few exceptions to this is the increasing participation of 
women in the workforce.  In 1961 there were three men to every woman in the labour 
market - and most of those women were young.  Today it is just over seven to six.  
However, most of the growth in female employment is in part-time work, for one of the 
features of the last decades has been the growth of various forms of non-standard 
employment.  These trends appear to be stronger in Australia than other countries, and 
superannuation seems to be one of the factors affecting it, as employers restructure jobs to 
avoid SG and other charges (Brosnan, et. al., 1996).   
 
Just over half the female labour force are in full-time permanent jobs compared with the 
male labour force which has more than three-quarters in full-time employment (Brosnan 
and Walsh, 1996).  A third of women are in part-time employment, compared with only one 
in ten men.  One in seven female employees are in casual employment compared to only 
one in 16 males (Brosnan and Walsh, 1996). 
 
Gregory and Hunter (1995) have produced startling figures on women's employment over 
the period 1976 to 1991.  They found that for the top half of neighbourhoods, the 
proportion of women who had jobs had increased approximately by 10 per cent, but for the 
bottom half of neighbourhoods, employment fell by 40 per cent.  In other words, in half of 
 9
Australian neighbourhoods the proportion of women employed was substantially less in 
1991 than it had been in 1976. 
Superannuation and Position in the Labour Market 
People who do not have ‘good’ jobs face the possibility that their employer may not have to 
make superannuation contributions on their behalf.  The SG excludes employees earning 
less than $450 per month.  This means that low paid employees and those on fluctuating 
incomes may not have the benefit of superannuation payments.  The groups who lose out 
most are part-time workers, casual workers, and workers forced to be contractors.  The 
workers without superannuation or in low paid employment are argued to be 
‘disenfranchised’ from the award superannuation system (Paatsch and Smith, 1992).  
Statistics indicate a greater extent of superannuation cover as incomes rise.  Thus, while 
only 56 per cent of workers with earnings lower than $200 per week were covered, 98 per 
cent of people earning more than $600 per week had superannuation coverage (ABS 1995: 
3). 
Part-time Workers 
Australia has possibly the OECD’s highest proportion of its labour force in part-time work.  
More than a third of working women are in part-time employment.  While it suits some 
people to work part-time, there are others who are forced to accept part-time work when 
they would have preferred full-time employment.  Some people in the latter group are 
forced to work two or more part-time jobs in order to obtain sufficient income.  The main 
disadvantages of part-time employment, as far as superannuation is concerned, are that 
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most part-time jobs tend to be jobs which provide little training thus they have lower hourly 
rates of pay, the shorter hours mean a lower weekly or monthly pay, and many part-timers 
would fall below the superannuation threshold in terms of their monthly earnings.  Those 
who have two jobs would probably exceed the threshold but they may not exceed it in 
either job and therefore miss out altogether. 
Casual Workers 
Australia has a large number of casual workers.  Burgess (1996) calculates the proportion 
of casuals in the labour force at 23 per cent.  As far as the law is concerned, each time a 
casual worker begins work, it is the beginning of a new contract of employment.  Thus for 
the permanent casual (those whose employment is on-going but performed under a casual 
contract), there is no accumulation of benefits from one period of employment to the next:  
no paid leave, nor any of the other benefits of standard permanent employment, follow 
workers from job to job.  This type of employment is a device used by employers to avoid 
the award conditions of standard employment.   
 
Beyond these phenomena, which are mainly demand-side factors, there are supply-side 
factors produced by the interaction of the labour market and women’s position within the 
household economy.  Due to the limited opportunities for women in the labour market and 
the survival of the male breadwinner model, the income received by many women is 
viewed differently than the income of their male partners.  Women’s income is seen as a 
‘bonus’ or as ‘a little extra’.  Thus superannuation is not seen as an integral component of 
their income from work.  The men and women in these families therefore fall into the pin 
 11
money trap whereby the woman’s earnings are essential for household survival but due to a 
short-term rather than long-term focus, these earnings produce little or no income after 
retirement.  The consequence is that the household is forced to survive on the limited 
superannuation produced by the male.  Cox (1994) contends, however, that in this context, 
workers on low incomes should not be required compulsorily to save for retirement as low 
income workers need access to all their earned income for on-going education, housing, 
and family expenses. 
 
The present system of superannuation, with its reliance on contributions according to the 
extent of paid work undertaken, means that workers in a range of employment situations 
will not have the opportunity to retire on adequate superannuation incomes.  The options 
for developing an adequate retirement income through superannuation for people in the 
non-waged sector are extremely limited. 
 
Problems of the Superannuation System for Women 
The problems of superannuation for women are manifest in the contradictory policy 
responses to areas within the superannuation system and in broader questions of retirement 
incomes.  Millbank (1993: 106) argues that the basis of superannuation in providing 
benefits only to those in the paid workforce structurally disadvantages women at the outset, 
given women’s lower labour force participation rates. 
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Table 1 establishes the relative disadvantage of women in relation to the accumulated level 
of superannuation assets.  While the difference between males and females at ages 15-19 is 
relatively small, the higher projected earnings potential of men escalates in middle and 
older ages.  Women’s superannuation savings patterns result in much lower contributions 
and as a consequence, extremely low retirement income payments. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 indicates women’s lower level of superannuation assets over their lifetime 
compared to men’s superannuation assets.  For those women over 65 years the level 
actually decreases while for males there is a continual rise.  The table indicates the 
markedly different patterns of superannuation savings between men and women and 
establishes that men fare much better through larger savings capacity and continual growth.  
Olsberg (1994: 46) cites figures in which a superannuation contribution of 10 per cent of 
salary for 46 years will produce retirement income of half current earnings.  In a UK study 
of older women’s work patterns, Ginn and Arber (1996) conclude that women who had 
comparable work histories with men (i.e. continuous, full-time work), were still 
disadvantaged in terms of income level derived from superannuation.   
 
The goal of increasing superannuation coverage for lower paid workers, the majority of 
whom are women, may not be the most appropriate course of action.  Simply increasing the 
access to superannuation coverage obscures the fact that the general level of women’s 
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superannuation contributions will not provide an adequate income in retirement 
(Rosenman, 1994). Ginn and Arber (1996) calculate that part-time workers with a continual 
contribution to superannuation accumulate a lesser level of superannuation savings than 
full time workers with access to superannuation who take time out of the workforce and 
return to full time employment. The trend to creating part-time and casual jobs rather than 
full time, permanent jobs which are being taken up by women (Brosnan, et. al., 1996) 
exacerbates the difficulty for women in accumulating superannuation savings to generate 
adequate retirement incomes. 
 
Problems in the ability to establish an adequate retirement income for workers with a low 
attachment to the labour market are compounded by the relationship to the publicly-
provided pension.  Olsberg (1994: 46) argues that these workers will only contribute 
enough funds to superannuation to ‘reduce their entitlement to a full pension’.  Moreover, 
the push to ensure that low paid workers compulsorily contribute to a superannuation 
scheme may unnecessarily disadvantage these employees.  It can be argued that lower paid 
workers need to utilise all their income for their present expenses and the compulsory 
superannuation system places too much of a financial burden on these workers for an 
uncertain benefit in the future.  An often overlooked point is the fact that employers’ SG 
contributions represent forgone salary and thus form part of workers’ salary entitlement 
(Brosnan, et. al., 1996).  Cox (1994: 31) argues that superannuation is not an appropriate 
savings mechanism for both low income earners and for those who have periods out of the 
paid workforce.  Women workers are particularly affected in both of these areas as they 
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constitute the majority of part-time employees (Paatsch and Smith, 1992) and take more 
time out of the workforce to care for families (Olsberg, 1994: 48).   
 
Onyx (1996: i) argues that women do not prepare adequately for retirement and as a result 
‘are increasingly at risk of facing a life of poverty in their old age’.  In a study of attitudes 
to retirement, Onyx (1996: 5) found that the predominant reasons given by women in full 
time employment for not planning for retirement were that they were concerned mainly 
with their current commitments and they considered their income too low.  For part-time 
employed women, the main reasons were that their pay was also considered too low but 
that they considered their spouses had the responsibility to provide retirement income 
(Onyx, 1996: 5).  The reliance on spouses in providing retirement income is a risky strategy 
for women in terms of the increasing divorce rate, with divorce claiming one in three 
marriages, and the fact that women outlive men (Mattila, 1990). 
 
Olsberg (1994: 48) identified two major problems of the SG for women: the first is the lack 
of access to employer contributions for employees earning low incomes; and the second is 
the diminution of smaller fund balances through administration fees.  Again, the 
disproportionate numbers of women in precarious employment means that women in 
particular suffer disadvantage in this area.  In an analysis of the ‘small balances problem’, 
Gallery, et. al., (1996) argue that the significant amount of time (eight years) which elapsed 
between the emergence of the problem and the enactment of legislation to protect funds 
means that large amounts of superannuation savings will not be realised as retirement 
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income for low income workers whose superannuation benefits consisted of small amounts 
in a range of funds. 
 
Paatsch and Smith (1992) identify a further inequity in the superannuation system in that 
the SG specifically excludes employees earning under $450 per month.  Superannuation 
coverage cannot be accessed by low paid workers and those whose earnings fluctuate.  
While the terms of the SG ensure that most workers receive award superannuation 
coverage, those employees whose salary is paid on a commission basis must accept a salary 
sacrifice in order to participate in the SG (Brosnan, et. al., 1996).  The SG, in this sense, 
further entrenches inequity as commission-only workers in effect pay for their own 
superannuation through salary reduction.   
 
Policy Responses of Interest Groups 
The superannuation system has a range of lobby groups competing to influence policy 
making in the area of superannuation and retirement incomes.  Public institutional actors, 
social and community groups, business interest groups, the ACTU, unions, and other 
groups with vested interests in superannuation have put forward differing agendas for the 
superannuation industry.  Consequently, the policy instruments and measures to develop 
the superannuation system are diverse and affect the workforce in various ways.  Millbank 
(1993: 117) argues ‘a fragmented legal and policy approach’ of addressing retirement 
income issues results in particular solutions to problems contradicting policy directions in 
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other areas.  The specific problems for women in superannuation are also contradictory to 
current industry practices. 
 
The ACTU has pursued compulsory superannuation for all workers and has argued that 
superannuation is an important employment condition for all women workers to gain 
(ACTU, 1991: 3).  However, the ACTU also recognises the limitations of the 
superannuation system in providing adequate retirement incomes for lower paid workers, 
predominantly women.  The ACTU congress noted that due to differences in careers and 
levels of earnings for women ‘super will only provide a supplement to the age pension’ 
(ACTU, 1995: 43).   
 
The Association of Superannuation Funds Australia (ASFA) is an organisation which was 
formed to advocate on behalf of Australian superannuation funds, trustees, and fund 
members (Clare, 1996).  The ASFA Research Centre has identified gender as a major 
research area to be addressed. Pertinent issues include the way in which differences in work 
patterns lead to differences in ability to contribute to superannuation funds and financial 
dependency issues (Clare, 1996: 3).   
 
The Women’s Action Alliance (WAA) has actively lobbied for greater recognition of 
unwaged women’s contribution to the national economy and, among other initiatives, 
called for the implementation of policy which allows women access to the superannuation 
of working partners.  The WAA proposes that single income families split superannuation 
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between the partners and be entitled to receive the consequent tax benefits of this 
arrangement (WAA, 1996).  Rosenman (1994: 166-7) suggests that in view of women’s 
incomes being ‘based less on their own earnings than on their income-earning partner’, 
issues of whether the non-waged partner should be entitled to ‘pooled rather than individual 
superannuation benefits’ need to be raised. 
 
The inability of full-time carers to access benefits is a significant problem in that the time 
out of the paid workforce lowers women’s level of lifetime earnings and consequently, the 
amount of retirement income.  While changes to the Occupational Superannuation 
Standards Act 1987 provide for women who move out of the paid workforce to continue 
making superannuation payments for up to two years (Mattila, 1990: 42), there is a 
difficulty in affording these payments without participating in paid work, and a two-year 
‘window’ may not be adequate.  Olsberg (1994: 48) argues that recognition of unpaid 
caring in the superannuation system could be achieved by a form of ‘subsidised accrual 
towards retirement income’ as the cost of these services is borne by the community if 
women do not engage in caring activities. 
 
The Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) has established a policy focus on general retirement 
incomes issues for women which integrates both public and private pensions.  The WEL 
proposal argues for ‘an unmeanstested pension, financed by a proportional levy on income 
and the redirection of funds resulting from the abolition of government tax concessions to 
superannuation’ (Owen, 1994: 6).  The funding of tax concessions for superannuation is of 
 18
concern as this measure is argued to be funded by the transfer of monies from age pensions 
and other social welfare measures (Cox, 1994).  Owen (1991) compared transfers to age 
pension recipients and superannuation beneficiaries and concluded that the average cost to 
the government of providing a pension was approximately $5,775 per person per annum 
whereas the subsidy for superannuation in terms of tax concessions for each superannuant 
was $8,190 per annum. 
 
The fact that women generally outlive men by eight years (Mattila, 1990) has been 
identified as an equity issue and a policy solution proposed that women receive less 
benefits over the term of their retirement to compensate male fund members (Clare, 1994). 
While the principle of equal treatment in pension schemes was upheld in a decision of the 
European Court, the ruling also confirmed a reliance on ‘“sex-based actuarial rates” for the 
calculation of transfer values and commutation values’ for pensions (Mazey, 1995: 599).  
While the superannuation system remains locked into providing equal treatment between 
members rather than focusing on ameliorating conditions which produce unequal outcomes, 
the disadvantage suffered by women will not be addressed.   
Conclusion 
Women’s generally more limited access to superannuation, poorer superannuation 
coverage, and lesser retirement benefits can be traced to women’s structural disadvantage 
in the labour market.  However, the policy responses to redress the discriminatory effects of 
the superannuation system have focused on gaining greater coverage for workers rather 
than challenging the operating basis of the system.   
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It is an irony that while women have been increasing their labour force participation, and 
making progress in overcoming barriers to inequality, the superannuation system is 
worsening the income gap between men and women.  The superannuation system as it is 
now configured, represents one of the principal sources of gender inequity.  Women lose 
out in almost every way: they work fewer years; their incomes, and therefore the 
superannuation paid on their behalf by their employers, is less; and women may work for 
small firms which have been required to make smaller contributions, and many  work for 
all or part of their careers in part-time, casual or even as home workers where they may 
receive no superannuation at all.  Furthermore, women may have worked for more 
employers through their working lives as they move in and out of the labour market, or 
move from part-time to full-time employment or back again.  Thus, they may have money 
in small accounts in many superannuation funds.  In addition, the fee structure ensures that 
their contributions grow at a slower rate.  There is no provision under the SG scheme for 
women to make up contributions for periods when they are out of the workforce, or in 
lower paid jobs. 
 
With the structure of superannuation based on a principle of what Rosenman (1994: 106) 
terms as ‘income replacement as the basis of retirement income’, the level of income 
generated during a person’s working life is the basis for determining the level of retirement 
income.  In contrast, the government-provided age pension is premised on a ‘needs basis’ 
and is paid at a flat rate (Clare 1994: 13).  Rosenman (1994: 166) argues that the 
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‘decoupling of the link between income and employment’ which occurs within the 
government pension system is a unique aspect of retirement incomes policy. This process is 
argued to avoid the discriminatory effects of the superannuation system which provides 
reward for long-term labour market contribution and ‘perceived economic contribution’ 
(Rosenman, 1994: 166).  
 
While the introduction of broader superannuation coverage has opened the possibility for 
workers to gain better retirement incomes than if they relied solely on the age pension, the 
difficulties in ensuring adequate and appropriate benefits for workers in this multi-billion 
dollar industry are immense.  Creating better labour market opportunities for women in an 
era of structural adjustment which has led to declining numbers of full time jobs and the 
winding back of award conditions is difficult to redress.  Instead, action could be targeted 
at improving the system of retirement incomes for women.  Women’s lobby groups have 
begun the process by highlighting the inadequacies of the present piecemeal system by 
offering policy solutions which entail devising an integrated retirement income strategy.  
However the impetus for a large scale push for a coherent and cohesive retirement income 
system is absent as these interest groups are diffused and do not have powerful 
communities of interest like the large superannuation providers to advocate for a synthesis 
of policy perspectives.  The lack of integration of private sector and public sector 
retirement incomes policy is a significant barrier to addressing problems of the adequacy of 
retirement incomes for women in Australia.   
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Figure 1 Employed Persons with Superannuation Coverage 
Source: ABS, 1995 Superannuation, Australia, Cat. No. 6319.0
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Table 1 Average Superannuation Assets Per Member by Age and Gender 
 
Age group Males Females 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65 and over 
$1,999 
$3,495 
$6,969 
$11,556 
$17,506 
$23,778 
$31,857 
$39,959 
$49,769 
$64,106 
$67,407 
 
$1,330 
$2,473 
$4,235 
$5,445 
$6,964 
$8,723 
$11,358 
$15,108 
$21,443 
$31,453 
$23,215 
All Ages $19,623 $14,187 
 
Source: Brown cited in Clare (1994) 
 
 
